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In this era of detente, 1973 is said to be the year for 
Europe. The issues of European security and coop­
eration loom larger as the recent breakthrough in 
Vietnam, at the SALT Negotiations and the Berlin- 
Moscow Treaties set the stage for what Mr. Nixon 
calls «the era of negotiations». Yet optimism that 
such progress will be repeated in Europe may be 
premature. There is a tendency in the West—par­
ticularly in Washington—to overestimate the pro­
spects for detente and cooperation, and to under­
estimate or even ignore some of the more subtle 
dimensions and problems involved. This paper 
examines these dimensions in the context of the 
West’s position in general, and of US policy to­
ward the Soviet Union in particular, and sug­
gests some alternative views toward a more ade­
quate framework for analysis.
In this era of revolutionary change, an era fea­
turing the closing of the bipolar world order and 
the new emerging forces that will shape the new 
one, is the West prepared—politically as well as 
militarily—to meet the challenges of the 1970’s? 
Will yesterday’s adversaries become tomorrow’s 
reluctant but realistic neighbors, or will the «thawing» 
cold war turn into a «hot» peace? Above all, how 
adequate are Western, and especially American, 
views of, and attitudes toward, Soviet external policy 
and behavior? These are some of the questions 
examined here. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to provide any definitive answers. But the focus may 
be sharpened, some of the main issues clarified, 
and a number of tentative conclusions reached.
the Nixon doctrine: 
the balance of power revisited
As the bipolar structure of the postwar interna­
tional order «has ended»,1 US foreign policy is 
confronted by an emerging world order featuring 
an increasingly multipolar structure, nuclear 
parity between the superpowers, and the conviction 
among the American people that other nations ought 
«...to share the burden of world leadership».2 The 
new «strategy for peace», whose main task is to seek 
—in this era in which the Powers «are compelled to 
coexist»3—to build an order which «...all will work 
to preserve because all recognize their stake in its
1. US Foreign Policy for the 1970's : A New Strategy 
for Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, Feb­
ruary 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 2.
2. US Foreign Policy for the 1970's : The Emerging 
Structure of Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard 
Nixon, February 9, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 3.
3. Flenry Kissinger, quoted in Nato Review, XX, 7-8 
(July-August 1972), p. 7.
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preservation»,1 is based on three main pillars: 
strength, partnership with our allies, and continued 
negotiations with our foes or adversaries.2 The su­
perpowers are likely to remain ideological adversar­
ies and to confront each other on a number of still 
divisive issues, but the new joint interests of «global 
trusteeship» give rise to a certain «commonalty 
of outlook»3 that encourages a spirit of Realpolitik, 
and restraints or inhibits ideological drive and any 
apocalyptic visions of world domination. Of course, 
the chief architects of the Nixon Doctrine do not 
expect the Soviet Union to suddenly be transformed 
into a conservative, status quo, Power, but the ex­
pectation (or hope) is that under the combined weight 
of domestic and intra-Bloc problems, the responsi­
bilities of maintaining the new «balance», and with 
the rise to power in the Soviet Union of a new, less 
revolutionary-minded generation, the Soviets «will 
more and more forsake ideological blinders», and 
opt for a more pragmatic policy based on enlightened 
self-interest.1 Indeed Mr. Nixon was far more emphat­
ic on this issue when he declared the passing of the 
«ideological accessories» of the past: «today», he 
asserted, «...the 'isms’ have lost their vitality».5
The stability of the new balance of power will 
result mainly from a basic consensus among the 
major actors on the fundamental legitimacy of the 
system which, as noted earlier, derives from a com­
mon interest to preserve it. Here is how Henry 
Kissinger puts it in the one work that seems to have 
most inspired the Nixon Doctrine:
Stability... means no more than an international agree­
ment about the nature of workable agreements and about 
the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. 
It implies the acceptance of the... system by all major 
powers.6
The major actors that are to forge together the new 
pentagonal order include, of course, China, Western 
Europe and Japan. It is assumed that they, along 
with the Soviet Union, are willing and able to perform 
the new roles as envisaged by Washington.7 But
1. US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s : The Emerging 
Structure of Peace, p. 13.
2. Walter F. Hahn, «The Nixon Doctrine: Design and 
Dilemmas», Orbis, XVI (Fall 1972), p. 363.
3. Kissinger, Op. cit., p. 7.
4. Hahn, Op. cit., p. 365.
5. US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s : A New Strategy 
for Peace, Op. cit., p. 3. Reference to the ideological elements 
as «accessories» suggests the view that these were at no time 
prominent or central to policy-making. It follows from this, 
that the 'isms’ did not have much vitality to lose, which, of 
course, is historically inaccurate, and especially for the 
Soviet case.
6. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, 
Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 (Boston, 
1957), p. I.
7. Stanley Hoffmann, «Weighing the Balance of Power», 
Foreign Affairs, 50, 4 (July, 1972), p. 639.
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the US redefinition of its allies’ commitments in 
terms of sharing a greater load of the burden of 
world peace, entails a re-distribution of military and 
political power which—given the present state of 
power imbalance between the US and the USSR, 
on the one hand, and Western Europe, China and 
Japan, on the other—does not seem forthcoming. 
For example, the US is very reluctant to promote 
the creation of a nuclear Europe, and expects contin­
ued deterrence credibility of its nuclear «umbrella» 
despite rising apprehensions in Europe and Japan 
over increasing popular support in the US for a 
«lowered profile» in world affairs and even voices 
for neo-isolationism. There is a lack of clarity in 
US policy—an ambivalence that is reflected in the 
contradiction between a desire for disengagement 
and self-restraint, and the persisting ambition of 
shaping a system in which its influence predomi­
nates.8 It is this sort of ambivalence that generates 
a sense of insecurity among allies, resulting in in­
creasing efforts not to support the new «balance», 
but instead to seek to accommodate differences with 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.9
In the transition from confrontation to nego­
tiation, the twin pillars of strength and partnership 
are vital,10 and that means partnership that does 
not regard US allies as mere pawns or «pieces in...a 
grand design»,11 but rather entails a relationship 
between equals. Thus, we arc told, any moves toward 
bilateral negotiations are to be coupled with close 
consultations with one’s allies, as in the case of SALT, 
the US-Soviet Trade Agreements, etc. But consulta­
tions means more than keeping one’s allies informed, 
and no amount of «briefing», however meticulous, 
will reduce the uncertainty about US policy, and the 
feeling among Europeans that they were in effect 
being asked to give their approval to decisions already 
made in Washington and in Moscow, decisions that 
are likely to affect them directly and often substantial­
ly. And that uncertainty stems not only from Washing­
ton’s strong emphasis on bilateral ties and its heavy- 
handed treatment of sensitive issues (e.g. the 1971 
monetary crisis), but also from what appears—and 
Mr. Kissinger’s assurances of an «underlying 
philosophy» to the contrary 12—as a certain lack
8. Ibid., p. 637.
9. Ibid. See also, Michael Mandelbaum and Daniel 
Yergin, «Balancing the Power», The Yale Review, LXII, 3 
(March, 1973), pp. 321-31; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, «Half 
Past Nixon», Foreign Policy (Spring 1971), pp. 3-21. This 
tendency seems to be growing in Western Europe where 
the lessons of Germany’s Ostpolitik has left a deep impres­
sion.
10. US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Building for Peace. 
A Report by Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 
1971 (Washington, 1971), pp. 30-31.
11. Ibid., p. 25.
12. As quoted in Nato Review, Op. cit., p. 6.
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of an overall central framework in US policy.1
The two key premises of the Nixon Doctrine in­
volve the gradual «decline» of Soviet ideology as a 
determinant of policy, and the related assumption 
of cumulative progress in consecutive negotiations. 
In reference to the latter, what may be called the 
«spill-over», or «linkage» effect,2 Mr. Kissinger 
said in connection with SALT and other issues 
that by simultaneous action
we have sought to move forward across a broad range 
of issues so that progress in one area would add mo­
mentum to the progress of other areas. We hope that the 
Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of 
negotiations.3
But also implied in the Nixon Doctrine is a neces­
sary dichotomy between a policy of Realpolitik on 
the one hand, and ideology, on the other. Yet, the 
fact, as will be shown later that the Soviets have 
embarked upon a policy of pragmatic and enlight­
ened self-interest, may change but does not necessar­
ily reduce4 * or inhibit the role of ideology as a 
guide to action or general framework for meaning 
and conceptual orientation. The alleged dichotomy 
between ideology and Realpolitik misses the crucial 
point in the relationship between ideology and power 
in a Marxist-Leninist context, a context which in
1. According to J. Robert Schaetzel, veteran diplomat 
and former US representative to the EEC, America no longer 
has a «foreign policy strategy» with which to meet the new 
complexities that demand synthesis and new direction. See, 
The New York Times, Sunday, October 29, 1972. And Brze- 
zinski, too, sees in US policy a lack of a common vision or 
central framework : «It is here that the Nixon Doctrine is 
most deficient. It is essentially a negative concept reacting 
to the excesses of the past .. . offering little leadership or 
historical direction». See Brzezinski, Op. cit., p. 13.
2. According to this view or theory, the interrelatedness 
or «multiple linkages» in US-Soviet relations throughout the 
world will increase their interdependence, so that action by 
the US in Vietnam will have a direct impact on Soviet behavior 
in Berlin. See Brzezinski, Op. cit., p. 467.
3. As quoted in Nato Review, Op. cit., p. 8.
4. The decline- or end-of-ideology thesis is based on a 
very narrow definition which views ideology as being a «dis­
tortion» of reality, or as a «... pseudo-systematic formulation 
of a total vision of the historical world». See Edward Shils, 
«The End of Ideology ?» pp. 49 - 63 ; and Raymond Aron, 
«The End of the Ideological Age?», pp. 27-48, in Chaim 
Waxman, ed., The End of Ideology Debate (New York, 1968). 
For a critique of the above based on a view of ideology as a 
broader, more flexible and more heterogeneous phenomenon 
that essentially specifies «a set of values that are more or less 
coherent», seeking «to link patterns of action to the achieve­
ment ... of a future (or the maintenance) of an existing state
of affairs», see Joseph La Palombara, «Decline of Ideology:
A Dissent and an Interpretation», in Ibid., pp. 315 -41. For 
the classic statement on the need to distinguish between
ideology as a distortion of reality, and ideology as a more 
flexible «utopian» sort, see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and
Utopia (London, 1955).
fact features an ideology of power.6 Indeed, as this 
paper will argue, the changing role of Soviet ideology 
promises to be more functional and assertive—though 
perhaps more subtle and indirect—in the world 
of the 1970’s. No doubt, recent Soviet emphasis on 
the politics of power and a business-like tone of 
behavior, tends to reinforce the view of a declining 
role for ideology. But it is erroneous to limit the role 
of ideology merely to a function of a variable depen­
dent on the short-run power interests of an elite in 
power, a view that ignores the broader framework 
of ideology’s role8 in the context of the evolving 
Soviet system, and world Socialism in general.
the new Soviet westpolitik’: 
coexistence and ideology
Soviet foreign policy is in a major transition phase. 
While seeking to normalize intra-Bloc relations after 
the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, Moscow is increasing­
ly confident about relations with the West and its 
«image» around the world, and is assuming a lead­
ing role in shaping the future of Europe and influenc­
ing the conduct of world affairs. Such developments 
as the Bonn-Moscow Treaties and the SALT Agree­
ments, along with the Soviet initiatives7 for a 
pan-European Security Conference (ESC), illustrate
5. R. Judson Mitchell, «The Brezhnev Doctrine and Com­
munist Ideology, The Review of Politics, 34, 2 (April, 1972), 
pp. 190 - 209. In What is to Be Done? and Imperialism, Lenin 
makes the important theoretical «break» with classical Marx­
ism, and lays the basis for an ideological framework based 
on the need for the «vanguard» of the proletariat and thus for 
power. See Robert Conquest, V. I. Lenin (New York, 1972); 
see also, Louis Althusser, Pour Marx (Paris, 1965), for a 
strong argument on the power- and action-oriented Leninist 
tradition.
6. Ideology provides meaning, relevance and quideposts 
to action, all of which are necessary in the making of choice, 
and this is particularly so at a time of rapid socio-political 
change, complexity and uncertainty about the future. See 
Henry D. Aiken, in Waxman, Op. cit., pp. 229-58; Willard 
A. Mullins, «On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science», 
The American Political Science Review, LXVI, 2 (June, 1972), 
pp. 498 - 510; Clifford Geertz, «Ideology as a Cultural System», 
in D. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York, 1964), 
pp. 47-76; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in the 
Soviet Union (New York, 1962); Philip Converse, «The Nature 
of Belief Systems in Mass Publics», in Apter, Op. cit., pp. 
206-261; Michael Walzer, «Puritanism as a Revolutionary 
Ideology», History and Theory, 3 (1963), pp. 59 - 90.
7. Formally launched at the Warsaw Pact’s Summit in 
Bucharest in July, 1966, and subsequently re-stated and refined 
at the April, 1967, Meeting of European Worker’s Parties at 
Karlovy Vary and at the Pact’s Summit in Budapest in March, 
1969, the proposal for an ESC called for the erection of new 
security arrangements for the continent to eventually replace 
the two hostile Blocs. The «common advantages» to all 
would be reduced tensions and armaments costs, increased 
East-West trade, and a general «spirit» of detente and co­
operation. Pravda, March 19, 1969; July 9, 1969; Jund 26, 
1971. Isvestia, April 15, 1970.
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this new thrust in Moscow’s foreign policy. Com­
menting on the flexibility and sense of sophistication 
of this policy, one author concludes that the Soviets 
«...have certainly come a long way from the days 
of the two-camp theory»,1 in their approach to 
Europe, while another, in reference to Moscow’s 
response to the EEC, finds that response to be 
«...highly flexible», and the ideological elements of 
the response «carefully calculated and very receptive 
to new information...».2 The 24th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist Party further illustrates the new 
emphasis on pragmatism and Realpolitik. The over­
all tone at the Congress was one of moderate cau­
tion, guarded optimism and a sense of conserva­
tism.3 On policy statements for Western Europe, 
the emphasis was on combining a pragmatic «mixture» 
between bilateral ties with different nations—espe­
cially in economic and technological terms, and a 
new security framework to be realized through an 
ESC.1 To be sure, Soviet long-term objectives have 
not changed: the demise of NATO and the reduction 
of American influence in Europe are still top prior­
ities. But instead of confrontation and potential crisis, 
the new policy aims at more subtle forms of influence ; 
by working with rather than against the prevailing 
«forces» in Europe,5 the influence of the US (and 
hence the power of the Western Alliance) might be 
neutralized. Thus the Soviets, «like cautious rentiers... 
propose to act prudently... slowly gathering the 
rewards of their improving position in the world».6
The apparent success of West German Ostpolitik 
could not have been achieved, had not the Soviet Union 
decided, for a number of domestic, intra-Bloc and 
external considerations, to pursue its own policy of 
Westpolitik based on detente and coexistence.7 It
1. Trond Gilberg, «Soviet Policies in Western Europe», 
Current History, 61, 362 (October, 1971), pp. 198-206.
2. David Forte, «The Response of Soviet Foreign Policy 
to the Common Market, 1957-63, Soviet Studies, XIX, 3 
(January, 1968), pp. 373-86. Emphasis added. The EEC, in 
the Soviet view, is too «rigid» and «exclusive», and the «dollar 
crisis» of 1971 is evidence that its present close ties to, and 
dependence in, the US is not in the «best interests» of all 
Europeans; see Pravda, June 26, 1971.
3. Adam Ulam, «The 24th Soviet Party Congress», 
Current History, 61, 362 (October, 1971), pp. 222-47; see also, 
Janis Sapiets, «The 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist 
Party», The Russian Review, 31, 1 (January, 1972), pp. 11-24.
4. Ulam, Op. cit., p. 223.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 224.
7. See Lawrence Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik (London, 
1971); and, Wolfgang Wagner, «German Ostpolitik and the 
East-West Realignment», International Journal, XXVII, 1 
(Winter 1971-2), pp. 18-31. For an excellent account of the 
historical precedents to Soviet views and policies of coexistence, 
an argument that views such a policy as deeply-rooted in 
the early revolutionary period and quite consistent with Lenin’s 
views on external affairs, see Evgeny Chossudovsky, «Genoa 
Revisited: Russia and Coexistence», Foreign Affairs, 50, 3 
(April, 1972), pp. 554-77.
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appears that Moscow, after a hard re-appraisal of 
the dangers and bitter fruits of past confrontation 
(e.g. in Berlin and Cuba) and an assessment of the 
Chinese challenge and the Czechoslovak crisis, has 
decided that a more prudent policy was in order, 
and that «...playing with fire is too dangerous a 
pastime for grown-up powers».8 The need now, 
it seems, is to limit one’s objectives and concentrate 
energy somewhere; and Moscow’s attention may well 
be focused on Europe, the one area in which the 
threat or use of force has shown to be ineffective 
and even counter-productive.
But in pursuit of its policy of coexistence, the Soviet 
Union is confronted by a serious dilemma: such a 
policy is reasonable (and increasingly necessary) in 
view of the realities of the Nuclear Age, and desirable 
since increases in contact and trade with the West 
relieve growing domestic pressures for more con­
sumer goods, technological and economic growth, 
etc.; but the Very same policy sets in motion within 
Soviet society and the Eastern Bloc, liberalizing 
forces toward 'incipient pluralism’ and ideological 
diffusion that undermine the purpose and unity on the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the hege­
mony of the Soviet Union. Was not Dubcek’s «So­
cialism with a human face» a result of such «openings» 
to the West and its ways? How, then, is Moscow to 
coordinate and control such inevitable openings or 
transactions between East and West, while pursuing 
its policy of detente and coexistence?9 In the current 
rapprochement with the West, as illustrated by the 
Warsaw Pact’s agenda10 for a Security Conference, 
Moscow must anticipate that Bloc member states 
may seek to pursue their own policy of Westpolitik, 
independently of Soviet dominance.11 Thus in the 
aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, growing 
criticism of the Pact by some member states,12 rein­
forced by severe attacks from China,13 has resulted 
in considerable intra-Bloc tensions and re-assertions
8. Wagner, Op. cit., pp. 23-4.
9. This dilemma was clearly evident in Brezhnev’s policy 
statement to the 24th CPSU Congress. See Sapiets, Op. cit., 
p. 16; and 24th Congress of the CPSU: Documents (Moscow, 
Novosti Press, 1971).
10. The main items include : (1) establishment of new princi­
ples governing relations between states, including the re­
nunciation of force; (2) relations contributing to the free flow 
of people, ideas and information; and (3) cooperation in the 
cultural and environmental fields. See, Michael Palmer, 
«The Prospects for a European Security Conference», The 
Atlantic Community Quarterly, 6, 3 (Fall 1971), pp. 299-300.
11. Robin A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, 
1971).
12. Thus far, Rumania has been the outspoken critic.
13. In one of a series of scathing attacks, Peking has 
branded Soviet proposals for a 'Socialist Community’ as 
«echoes of imperialist ravings», and as «synonyms for colonial 
empire». Peking Review, 13, 17 (April 17, 1970), p. 10, quoted 
in Ibid., p. 140.
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of sovereignty. Ceauseseu’s direct criticism at the 
July, 1968, Meeting of the Warsaw Pact—as if in 
anticipation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia—sent 
reverbarations throughout the Communist world:
When the Warsaw Pact was set up, it was conceived as 
an instrument of collective defense ... not a reason for 
justifying interference in the internal affairs of other 
states.1
Such signs of internal dissent and pressure for 
more collective decision-making within the Pact 
are growing,2 and Moscow is apparently willing to 
accept some sharing of power, provided internal 
cohesion is maintained to meet the possible divisive 
and de-stabilizing effects of detente and coexis­
tence.3 In other words, the Soviet Union is seeking 
to make the prospects for «openings» to the West 
conditional upon the acceptance by Pact members 
of the vital priorities, namely internal coherence and 
a'united front’. Thus it appears, that more and more 
the Warsaw Pact is assuming an increasingly impor­
tant internal role of coordination and control,4 a 
role that seems necessary in an era when the 'threat’ 
of former enemies has diminished, and that of new 
adversaries is not widely seen as urgent or serious.5 6
It is increasingly evident that, despite Moscow’s re­
peated warnings for the need to «prepare» against 
the new Chinese «threat» to the USSR «.. .and the 
other socialist countries»,c many East Europeans do 
not share Soviet views on the new China; consequent­
ly the new «threat» has not been very effective as a 
binding force within the Warsaw Pact. In this con­
text, the view that the Warsaw Pact is becoming an 
instrument for military and political coordination 
among European Communist states,7 is essentially 
correct.
The Soviet response to the «paradox» of coexis­
tence and incipient pluralism or liberalism, has been 
the so-called «Brezhnev Doctrine». Initially advanced
1. Agerpress, July 15, 1968. Quoted in Ibid., p. 108.
2. Signs of dissent were evident as early as 1966, despite 
Kosygin’s assurances of «unity» and «cohesion». Pravda, 
October 14, 1966.
3. Remington, Op. ctt., p. 125; see also, Whetten, Op. 
cit., p. 40.
4. Remington, Op. cit., p. 125; Karl Birnbaum, Peace in 
Europe (London, 1970), p. 111.
5. The alleged threat of West German «revanchism» and 
«militarism» is no longer credible, and China seems far re­
moved from the issues and problems confronting most Euro­
peans.6. Remington, Op. cit., p. 143. Emphasis added.
7. Ibid., p. 109. It may well be, that during periods of
relatively prolonged detente, the respective functions of op­
posing blocs or coalitions tend to be oriented more towards
the political rather than the military aspects of policy objec­
tives.
in Pravda to support and justify8 Soviet intervention 
in Czechoslovakia, and subsequently refined and 
broadened9 so as to provide an analysis of (and 
theoretical basis for) current trends in social devel­
opment and modernization and the effects of these 
on the foreign policy of the 'Socialist Commonwealth’, 
the Doctrine has been generally viewed as a reaction 
to the needs for continued revolutionary dynamism 
by a Power that must also attend to the demands of 
superpower status,10 or as a hasty attempt to justify 
the Soviet decision to intervene in the affairs of other 
socialist states on the basis of the concept of «limited 
sovereignty».11 In both such views, the emphasis is 
on treating the Brezhnev Doctrine mainly as a func­
tion of the short-run power interests of the Soviet 
elite; ideology is seen as having a derivative function 
dependent upon power interests and relationships. 
But such views, which regard Soviet ideology as an 
«esoteric code» that has been «routinized» and used 
by the elites to «seil» the system to the masses and 
re-assure their own legitimacy,12 ignore the fun­
damental relationship between ideology and system 
change or transformation, and miss the long-term 
ideological implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine 
and the new interpretations of the problems and 
prospects of socialist development that it entails.13 
Ideology does not merely serve to legitimize the 
functions and protect the power interests of the So­
viet elite; it also provides them with operational 
guidelines and thus shapes their responses to various 
circumstances. It is, after all, the task of the elite to 
explain and assess the immediate and long-term sig­
nificance of socialist and capitalist development 
trends—a process that gives meaning and coherence 
to foreign policy priorities.14 It is simply false and 
misleading to hold that ideology in the Soviet Union— 
in spite of the effects of bureaucratization and social
8. Sergei Kovalev, «Sovereignty and the International 
Obligations of Socialist Countries», Pravda, September 26, 
1968.
9. O. Klestov, «New Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty», In­
ternational Affairs (July, 1970), pp. 11-18; Leonid Brezhnev, 
«In Defense of Socialism and Peace», International Affairs 
(September, 1968), pp. 1-7.
10. See John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New 
York, 1971); Michel Tatù, «L’Invasion de Tchécoslovaquie 
et la Detente en Europe», in J. Lukaszewski, ed., Les Dé­
mocraties Populaires Apres Prague (Bruges, 1970), pp. 95-106.
11. Ghita lonescu, «Le Nationalisme en Europe de l’Est», 
in Lukaszewski, Op. cit., pp. 223-250; T. Davletshin, «Limited 
Sovereignty», Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the 
USSR, XVI (August, 1969), pp. 3-9.
12. See Alfred G. Meyer, «The Functions of Ideology 
in the Soviet Political System», Soviet Studies, XVII, 3 (Jan­
uary, 1966), pp. 273-85.
13. Mitchell, Op. cit., p. 191.
14. Ibid. See also, R.J. Mitchell, «The Revised ’Two 
Camps’ Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy», Orbis, XVI, 1 
(Spring 1972), p. 23.
95
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 04:17:32 |
Έτζιθεώρήΰις ' Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών γ' τρίμηνον 1973
differentiation— has been reduced to «...a mere 
ritual... almost as removed from actual life and its 
activities as Sunday sermons».1 Indeed, it may well 
be argued that it is precisely at this time of increasing 
development and social differentiation in the Soviet 
Union and other socialist states, that ideology may 
yet play a more important and flexible role2 in 
terms of providing a broad framework for under­
standing the complex phenomena of today’s world, 
and in integrating the differentiated (and potentially 
divisive) groups and structures in socialist societies.
The view of the world that emerges from the 
Brezhnev Doctrine is that of two structurally similar 
but opposing social systems engaged in a competitive 
struggle for survival and power. But there is no longer 
here the determinism of previous Soviet analyses 
pointing to the inevitable victory for the socialist 
camp, resulting from the «inherent contradictions 
of capitalism»;3 Indeed, automatic victory can no 
longer be assured, as increasing modernization and 
development have ushered in «difficulties» or «con­
tradictions» in some sectors of the socialist camp 
(e.g. Czechoslovakia and to some extent Poland), 
that now make the restoration of capitalism and 
«bourgeois ideology» possible.4 This significant 
admission of «difficulties» or what may be called 
«the weakest links of socialism»,5 constitutes a 
major departure from previous doctrine, and is the 
central theoretical contribution of the Brezhnev Doc­
trine to contemporary Soviet analysis of social 
development and the international world order.
1. Meyer, Op. cit., p. 284.
2. For a valuable and much-needed «debate» on Soviet 
ideology and Sovietology centering on the multiple dimensions 
and functions of ideology in a changing socio-political con­
text, see J.M. Bochenski, «The Three Components of Com­
munist Ideology», Studies in Soviet Thought, 11, 1 (March, 
1962j, pp. 7-11; David Joravdsky, «Soviet Ideology», Soviet, 
Studies, XVIII, 1 (July, 1966), pp. 2-19; Rudolf Schlesinger, 
«More Observations on Ideology», Soviet Studies, XIX, 1 
(July, 1967), pp. 87-99; Kurt Marko, «Soviet Ideology and 
Sovietology», Soviet Studies, XIX, 4 (April, 1968), pp. 465- 
481; Robert G. Wesson, «Soviet Ideology: The Necessity 
of Marxism», Soviet Studies, XX (July, 1969), pp. 64-70; 
Vera Pirozhkova, «The Recent Events in Czechoslovakia 
and the Fundamentals of Soviet Foreign Policy», Bulletin 
of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, (October, 1968), 
pp. 5-13; Richard Lowenthal, «Development versus Utopia 
in Communist Policy», Survey (Winter-Spring 1970), pp. 3-27; 
François Billoux, «Peaceful Coexistence and Ideology», 
World Marxist Review, XV, 1 (January, 1972), pp. 47-56; 
and Erwin Scharf, «Socialism’s Impact on System of Interna­
tional Relations», in Ibid., pp. 57-64.
3. See Marx and Engels, Selected works. Voi. 1; Lenin, 
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York, 
1939), pp. 119-22.
4. Pravda, June 8, 1969, p. 3; A. Sovetov, «The Present 
Stage in the Struggle Between Socialism and Imperialism», 
International Affairs (November, 1968), p. 4.
5. Mitchell, «The Brezhnev Doctrine..·», Op. cit., p.
191.
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In the Soviet view, the weakest link thesis provides 
both a rationale for collective efforts «in defense» of 
those socialist states whose level of development 
make them «ripe» for «revisionism» and even capi­
talism, and—more importantly a prescription for a 
state of preparedness throughout the socialist system 
of states. As emphasized by Brezhnev, that pre­
scription for preserving the integrity and «solidarity» 
of the socialist camp against «imperialist» attempts 
of «...seeking out the weak links... and drive wed­
ges between them»,6 consists of: intensification of 
the ideological struggle against «revisionism» and 
«noncomformity»,7 greater coordination, in all fields, 
of the activities of all socialist countries,8 and a 
strengthening of the role of the party throughout 
the socialist camp. The message of the new directives 
was clear : the main threat to socialism lies in spontan­
eous development and the possible restoration of 
«bourgeois» ideology. Clearly, the Soviets have 're­
discovered’ Lenin’s warning9 that spontaneity in 
socialist development and modernization inexorably 
leads to a decline in revolutionary dynamism, and 
the creation of social roles and structures antithetical 
to it. As one contemporary disciple of the Leninist 
tradition puts it, the need is to
act on ideology and transform it into an instrument of 
deliberate action on history... men’s adaptation to their 
conditions cannot be left to spontaneity, but must be 
constantly assumed, dominated and controlled-hence the 
need for ideology.10
Mere obedience to the forces of history, as Marx 
would have it, will not do; to prevent ideological dif­
fusion, Brezhnev restores Lenin’s emphasis on organi­
zational power, thus drawing attention to the fun­
damental relationship between ideology and political 
power. Thus it is dubious and misleading to assert, 
as the Nixon Doctrine implicitly does, a simple dichot­
omy between ideology and power. As Mitchell points 
out:
This is precisely the Leninist contribution to the ideology 
-—the insertion of organizational power as a crucial vari­
able into an ideological framework that was developmental, 
functionalist and teleological.11
Reflecting a continuity with previous policy state-
6. Brezhnev’s speech at Warsaw, November 12, 1968. 
Cited in Pravda, November 13, 1968, and quoted in Ibid., 
p. 193.
7. Pravda, June 8, 1969, p. 4.
8. Ibid., p. 2.
9. Lenin, What is to Be Done? (New York, 1929), p. 90; 
see also, Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York, 1957), 
pp. 39-60.
10. Althusser, Op. cit., pp. 232-35.
11. Mitchell, Op. cit., p. 207.
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merits,1 the above clearly indicate that peaceful 
coexistence does not extend to the province of ideol­
ogy. Indeed, under the new conditions of «peaceful 
competition»,2 conditions that now make it possible 
and desirable to «mobilize» world public opinion and 
the support of «all European peoples» for Moscow’s 
new «peace offensive» as would be expressed by 
convening a Security Conference on Europe,3 the 
prospects are that «.. .the struggle is now primarily 
an ideological one, with the outcome open-ended».4 
For in the communist view, it must be remembered, 
the concepts of «peace» and «security» have a dual 
character: while reflecting major tactical steps in a 
new policy of Realpolitik aiming at the prevention 
of major war and the promotion of enlightened self- 
interest in the present world, they continue to be em­
bodied in a logically coherent vision, world-view or 
Weltanschaaung of a world order that is to be in the 
future·, thus they suggest properties that are far more 
broadly political and action-oriented than would be 
found in their Western counterparts. As one author 
says flatly, «...the struggle for peace and security 
is closely intertwined with the struggle for human 
progress, and a revolutionary remaking of the 
world».5
In the Soviet context, the pursuit of practical 
matters of enlightened self-interest is not incompat­
ible with intensification of the ideological front; 
indeed, the two may coexist and even reinforce each 
other. It may well be, that the Soviets are not pre­
pared to be restricted in their practical behavior by 
Marxism dogma; but neither are they prepared to 
give up a familiar guide to understanding and action, 
and now especially that new departures (and uncer­
tainties) in policy give it a new and active role.
conclusion
After the initial period of skepticism during which 
the Soviet appeals for an ESC were branded as «mere 
propaganda» and the proposed agenda viewed as 
«nebulous and imprecise»,6 the US has belatedly 
and unenthusiastically agreed to hold preparatory 
talks for an ESC. We shall not comment on the pru-
1. The Central Committee of the CPSU, quoted in The 
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, August 7, 1963, pp. 22-23.
2. T. Timofeyev, «The Role of Social Forces in Action
For European Security», International Affairs, 2 (February,
1972), 30.
3. Ibid., p. 31.
4. O. Selyaninov, «Proletarian Internationalism and the 
Socialist state», International Affairs (November, 1969), p. 
10. See also, Billoux, Op. cit., p. 56.
5. Sh. Sanakoyev, «The Soviet Union’s Struggle For 
Peace and Security of Nations», International Affairs, Op. 
cit., pp. 67-75.
6. William Rogers, «Our Continuing Commitment to 
Western Europe», Department of State Bulletin, December 
29, 1969, p. 624.
dence of the continued latent skepticism in Washing­
ton and elsewhere; no doubt some caution is 
necessary, lest an inflated «spirit» of detente cre­
ates pressures in the West, which may further under­
mine its unity and bargaining position if the rising 
expectations for real peace and detente are not real­
ized. But whatever the virtues of such tactical moves 
in this era of negotiations, it is becoming increasingly 
imperative that the West—whether it waits or decides 
to take up the initiative for European security and 
cooperation—must speak uniformly and with the 
same voice. In the continued absence of such unity, 
which is further compounded by America’s ambiva­
lence vis-a-vis Europe and its overemphasis on the 
military-strategic aspects of security at the neglect 
of the social-political ones,7 the alternative seems 
to be continued «selective detente»: thus, the West 
must somehow act; but it acts not as a unit, but in 
its various parts, thus inviting Moscow to achieve, 
bilaterally and piece-by-piece, some of the main 
objectives it has been seeking all along multilate- 
rally.8 Until the West re-assesses its common goals 
and purpose, and achieves a common definition of 
«security» in Europe, it will remain in relative disad­
vantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Moscow’s emerging challenge to the West is not 
a military or technological one, but essentially a 
challenge to the ability of the West to unify and 
strengthen its common purpose. It is a subtle and 
indirect (and thus less apparent or manageable) 
challenge aimed at the West’s ability to look upon 
and resolve problems within a commonly accepted 
framework. The possible alternative of the failure 
to achieve such a framework is well put by Camps:
Increasingly, many problems will have to be looked and 
acted upon as common ... or the network of existing re­
lationships, both socio-economic and political, will have 
to be deliberately loosened.9
7. As one author puts it, «The slogan L'Europe se fera 
en marchant only makes sense if this Europe gets a better idea 
about the direction in which it is supposed to march ...». 
See, Gasteyger, Op. cit., p. 156; see also comments by Mr. 
Brandt’s secretary to the effect that the key issue for Nato 
consists not so much of military security, but of the challenge 
of political manipulation; cited in Der Spiegel, 10 February, 
1969. Brandt himself has called for a «New Relationship» 
between the US and Europe based on military security through 
the Western Alliance system, and a «true partnership» based 
on «political interdependence» between the US and Europe. 
See his «Germany’s 'Westpolitik’», Foreign Affairs, 50, 3 
(April, 1972), pp. 416-426.
8. For the strong tendency in Europe to assume the poli­
tical initiative while depending on US security guarantees, 
see Heinrich End, «Political Tensions in the Mediterranean 
Theatre», Europa Archiv, 21 (Fall 1971).
9. Miriam Camps, «European Unification in the Seven­
ties», International Affairs, 47, 4 (October, 1971), p. 676; see 
also Richard N. Cooper, «Economic Interdependence and 
Foreign Policy in the Seventies», World Politics, XXIV, 2 
(January, 1972), pp. 159-181.
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A mutual problem-solving orientation will first re­
quire, that the relevant issues and priorities facing 
the West are so framed or posed, that they correspond 
not to some current or popular notion of the «prob­
lem» and the level of its solution, but to the real 
dimensions of the problem itself. In other words, 
there are tendencies—and this is characteristic of 
the ambivalence in US policy noted earlier— to «push» 
to the European level certain issues, not on the basis 
of the appropriate problem-dimensions that such 
issues raise, but rather on the basis of a set of «im­
ages» that the notion of Europe as a weak or powerful 
actor on the international scene might evoke.1 Thus 
in the context of European security, the need for a 
coordinated Western Ostpolitik will not be realized 
until the NATO Allies—in addition to a common 
military defense policy—design an appropriate po­
litical framework of security,2 and until the US 
political commitment to Europe is broadened and 
clarified. There is a serious discrepancy in treating 
Europe both as a military whole and a set of politi­
cal parts, a discrepancy that may open up new options 
for Soviet policy in the area.
In a world of increasing social and economic 
interdependence, ever-growing patterns of trans­
national3 (and supranational) phenomena that tran­
scend national boundaries and elude government di­
rection or control, and the obscuring of the bounda­
ries between domestic and external affairs, the very 
nature of security is taking on added dimensions. 
Security in today’s world entails a complex network
1. Ibid., p. 675.
2. Gasteyger, Op. cit., p. 159.
3. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., «Trans­
national Relations and World Politics», International Organi­
zation, XXV, 3 (Summer 1971).
of phenomena, involving far more than the military 
and technological considerations. Reflecting on the 
sort of policy required to meet the Soviet challenge in 
Europe, one author perceptibly points out that
there are infinite gradations of the strength which makes 
it possible to oppose Soviet policies and the weakness 
which makes it necessary to comply with them.4
The new patterns of interaction and forces of 
change in the relations between nations and within 
them, reflect the increasing complexity and structural 
differentiation that are characteristic of our modern 
era. Herein lies the major task facing the West in the 
70’s: change and differentiation are an integral part 
of the processes of growth, development and prog­
ress; but differentiated structures—along with im­
portant changes in popular attitudes and values—need 
to be integrated and coordinated, lest their divisive 
tendencies result in fragmentation. In the Soviet 
Union, a new role for a changing, more flexible and 
less doctrinaire ideology seems to be designed to 
meet this task. Is the West as well preoccupied or 
prepared? The Soviets seem to know the kind of 
world they want to build—do we? If the West is to 
move away from the ideological defensive and assume 
the initiative in building the new world; if it is to 
unify and re-organize itself for the complex tasks 
that lie ahead, then it will have to establish a common 
«image» of that world, the set of priorities required, 
and the conceptual framework needed to define and 
view common problems in perspective, and then 
solve them. If this is not a prescription for some sort 
of appropriate ideology, it is a call for its functional 
equivalent.
4. The Economist, August 14, 1971, p. 12.
The concept of economic stress may be more useful than that of social disturbance in describ­
ing the adjustment process. Economic development implies an opening up of a new range of econom­
ic opportunities. Exploitation of these opportunities can imply a breach of traditional social obser­
vances and this may be reckoned to have a cost.
David Feldman, Politics and Change in Developing Countries
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